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I.

Introduction
Does the number of siblings amongst whom we grow up matter to our

later fortunes in life?

Do

children who are raised in large families

undergo some "cost of siblings" in terms of fewer parental resources
received during childhood and a resultant loss of income-earning potential
as adults?

1

And does such a process imply the perpetuation of poverty

from one generation to the next among low-wage high-fertility groups?
The following analysis adds to other evidence indicating there
is some such cost of siblings, i.e. that on average children from large
families receive less schooling, do less well on tests of intelligence,
and using indicators such as height, weight and age at menarche, appear
less well-nourished than children from small families, even controlling
for socio-economic class. 2

But my purpose in this analysis is to go

beyond the simple negative correlation now increasingly confirmed between
family size and various measures of child welfare, to consideration of
the underlying causes of that negative correlation.

My objective is to

illuminate more precisely what factors ultimately determine the persistent and oegativeLy-related"aifferences across parents between numbers of children
and allocation of resources to inv.estment in those children.
Data used for the analysis are from a 1967-68 family budget study
in the four major cities of Colombia; 3 they include information on expenditures by the household on a wide variety of categories, as well as infor
mation on income of each person in the household, age and educational
attainment of the husband, wife and all children present, and ·the number
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting

of the Population Association of America, Atlanta, 1978. The author
thanks the members of the Yale Labor and Population Workshop, especially
Mark Rosenzweig and T. Paul Schultz for many useful comments; Philip
Musgrove for his suggestions and help; and David Bruce for computer
assistance. Financial support from the Ford-Rockefeller Foundation
Population and Development Policy Research Program, and from the
Battelle Memorial Institute Population and Development Policy Program,
is gratefully acknowledged.
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of wife's children-ever-born and children living.
In the following discussion, "investment in children" will refer
to current expenditures of parents' time and money on children which
.are likely to contribute to the children's future earning power.

The

measures of parental investment in children used here are education
related, including both current household expenditures on education, and
the educational attainment of children present in the household relative
to that of other children in their age-sex group.

Education is a particu

larly good commodity for ·analysis of this type, since it is clearly child
specific, and market expenditures on it are much less affected by the pro
blem of economies of scale than are expenditures on such commodities as
clothing and housing.
My

analysis is based on a specific view of the household decision

makinE process underlying the simple negative correlation between family
size and investment per child.

Consider that the negative correlation

could result for three conceptually distinct reasons.

First:

large

numbers of children impose additional burdens on parents, directly
causing a reduction in the amount of resources they allocate to each
child.

This is the reasoning implicit in most standard analyses of
.4

family budgets.

The initial appeal of this explanation-that parents' time

and money cannot be

stretche<l

proportionately to accommmodate a growing

household--provides little insight into why parents, who as a group have
access to the same intuition and can foresee the constraining effect of
many children on per-child expenditures, differ in their apparent choices
regarding number of children and per-child expenditures. 5
Second, an explanation often raised in the literature on fertility
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and its determinants:

parents who wish to invest much of their time and

money income in their children will restrict family size.

6

This is the

first explanation turned on its head, and also to some extent begs the
question as to why parents differ in their apparent desires regarding
allocation of resources to children.
Third:

the possibility that the direction of causality between

family size and child welfare is not unique, that for parents neither
the decision (or lack thereof) regarding family size nor that regarding
investment per child precedes the other.

In this view,. the two sets of

choices are interdependent and jointly determined by characteristics of
the parents and of the economic and social environment in which they
live.

(Such a view does not preclude the possibility that parents neither

"plan" consciously for number of children nor investment per child; the
iS$ue in this case is what determines such joint nondecisions.)
It is the third view which is the basis for the following analysis;
it begins with the assumption that the behavior of parents regarding per
child investment cannot be viewed as independent from their apparent
choices regarding the number of children to have.

The joint persistence

of the contradictory explanations one and two, alternatively offered by
different analysts depending on their initial set of interests (i.e. the
causes of differences in child welfare, or the causes of fertility differ
ences) in itself lends credence to the third which, since it subsumes and
reconciles the first two, is theoretically more appealing.

The findings

reported in this paper are largely consistent with this third view of
the underlying process.

General conclusions include the following:
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1.

In the simple correlative sense (based on ordinary least squareb

estimation) there is a clear "cost of siblings," which persists even con
trolling for household income and other characteristics.

The relationship

of additional children to per-child investment is negative and nonlinear.
Per-child investment declines monotonically as family size increases;
but once the dependent variable is standardized for age, a particular
and different pattern emerges:

Up to three or four children, families

maintain steady investment per child; with five and more children, invest
ment per child is distinctly lower.
2.

Using a model in which number of children and investment per

child are jointly determined (two-stage least squares estimation), we
find that large family size has an important negative effect in the
causal

sense on per-child investment.

In this sample, as much as a 30

percent increase in the income of the head of household would be required
to offset the negative effect of one additional child on a household's
per-child educational expenditures.
implication is clear:

From a policy point of view, the

reductions in fertility will increase parents'

investments in children's education.

This is true partly because parents

who seek to invest more restrict their fertility; but it is also true
that an increase in parents' educational investment per child would
follow even from a decrease in family fertility brought about solely by
lower contraceptive costs.
3.

This negative effect of fertility on investment in children

could be interpreted as inevitably causing the perpetuation of poverty
across generations among high-fertility groups, short of very substantial
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increases in income for already-1.~ge families.
be correct?

Probably t;ta.t:

is not inevitable.
interrupted,

Would such a conclusion

though family size matters, the vicious cycle

The analysis suggests one way such a cycle can be

Although rural-urban migrants have larger

families than

otherwise comparable longterm urban residents (probably reflecting the
different economic environment in which the originally-rura l families
made their fertility decisions; such families face different relative
prices for children and inputs to children--an example is different avail
ability of contraceptives) , and apparently spent less on education of
their children while in the rural area (children of comparable urban fami
lies have higher educational attainment), their current educational spend
ing is similar to that of long term urban residents.

Current spending is

apparently not so greatly influenced by the migrant families'
prior economic and social envi,ronment.

Thus there operates some kind

of a catch-up mechanism; despite higher fertility, larger average fami
lies, and lower average educational attainment of children (age and sex
standardized), migrant families adopt the educational spending habits
of their urban counterparts; they do not spend less per child than those
of comparable income and education.
Thus we know that certain economic conditions (associated in this
case with a move to an urban area, but other routes to changing prices

7
are imaginable) cause a decline in fertility; from conclusion 2 above,
we know this lower fertility has a direct positive effect on per-child
educational investment.

Furthermore, in the case of recent migrants,

even given already-large family size, a change in economic environment
shifts investment upward.

This increased educational spending by migrant

-6-

parents will lowe.· their children 's fertilit y in the next generati on,
since educatio n of parents itself has an independ ent negative effect on
Even a modest increase in investm ent for one generati on will

fertilit y.

lead to decrease s in the fertilit y of the next; and modest decrease s in
the fertilit y of current parents have an immedia te effect on their chil-
dren 's schoolin g.
Section II of this paper is a short discussi on of the model on which
the analysis is based; in Section III

empiric al findings are presente d

and discusse d.
II.

Analyti cal framework
A

link between family size and child welfare (or child quality)

is built into a model of fertilit y proffere d by Willis, as well as Becker
and L~is,

8

in which the househo ld is viewed as maximiz ing a utility

flll'l.ction of the form:
U .,. U(N, Q, Z)

where N is the number of children , Q is their quality or the househo ld
investm ent in them, and Z represen ts the rate of consump tion of all other
commod ities.

N

and Q enter as separate argumen ts in the utility function ,

but child service s, C, is set equal to NQ, and it is C which is produced
(along with Z) accordin g to the linearly homogeneous producti on function :
x)
C.,. NO• f(t,
C
C
•

where t

C

and x

C

are vectors of the total amount of time and goods parents

devote to children during the parents ' lifetime .
The fact that in cross-se ction studies and over time, higher-i ncome
families tend to have fewer children is explaine d in two ways.

First is
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a price effect.

The principal "cost" of children is an opportunity cost,

the time parents and especially mothers devote to childbearin g and child
rearing.

Higher-wage parents experience greater opportunity costs in

rearing children.

9

This price effect apparently

swamps any positive

€ffect of income on the demand for children.
Second is an explanation that bears more directly on the issue
of child welfare and its relation to family size, namely the observation
that parents may wish to substitute quality for quantity in the production
(rearing) and consumption (enjoyment) of children, i.e .. with greater
income parents may spend more time and monetary resources on fewer children
as an alternative to having more children.

A critical feature of the

model is that even without any special assumption about the substitution
between quantity and quality in the parents' utility function or in house
hold production, it will be tiue that for a smaller number of children,
the true shadow price parents face for quality in those children is lower;
and that similarly for a greater number of children, the true shadow price
of quality is higher.

This follows because of the multiplicat ive relation

ship between N and Qin the production of child services; parents cannot
"produce" children without producing in them some degree of "quality,"
10
(This, in fact, would
nor can they produce "quality" without children.
be true for any commodity with both a quality and quantity component.)
The model not only explains the empirical finding that as wage
income of households increases, parents have fewer children.

It also

implies that high-wage parents will invest more in each of the fewer
children they have, if only because the price of a given level of quality

per child is lowered with fewer children.

In addition, of course, higher

wage parents may have higher quality goals for their children, but such

shifts in taste for quality with increases in wage income are not actually
nece~sary for the quality-qua ntity substitution effect predicted by the
model to 9ccur.
The interaction between quality and quantity also causes a downward
bias in the observed income elasticitie s for both N and Q; the direct or
true effect of an increase in money income is to increase demand for both
N and Q, but those increases in N and Q cause their shadow prices to rise,
offsetting the pure income effect and reducing the observed income effect.
Some critical features of the model, relevant to the following
empirical work, should be pointed out:
1.

The model is static.

Family size and parental investment in

children are the result of jointly-dete rmined utility-max imizing deci
sions of parents made presumably at the beginning of their childrearin g
years.

As children arrive, parents cannot change or adjust plans based

on new information regarding their taste for children; as children grow,
parents cannot alter investment strategies based on the ability or
willingness of their children to participate in the investment process.
Further, parents are assumed to foresee perfectly their future stream
of income.
This aspect of the model is hardly meant to represent reality.
However, as a framework for empirical work, a static model has the
advantage of being consistent with the use of cross-sectio n data.

Use

of a lifetime utility-maxi mizing model would require information from
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households over a long period.

This model permits use of a measure of

cumulative fertility to the present (standardize d by age of mother) and
a measure of cumulative investment in children to the present (such as
their educational attainment, also standardize d for their age) or of
current investment in education.
There is a seven or eight year lag between the time when parents
conceive a child and begin spending on that child's education. To the
extent that expansion of educational facilities in Colombia was greater
in the 1960s than parents having children in the 1950s might have expected,
the negative effect of number of children on per-child investment would
be attenuated, and we have a strong test of the principal hypothesis.
In fact, the rate of increase in the proportions of children enrolled
11
did accelerate in the mid-sixties .
2.

An assumption of the model is that there is no joint production

nor are there economies of scale in producing, or raising, children.
This is highly questionabl e where parents' time is concerned (few mothers
increase time spent in child care proportiona tely as additional children
are born), and even for purchased inputs to children such as clothing or
However, it is not unreasonabl e to assume there are few economies

housing.

of scale in the purchase of schooling, which is the measure of investment
used here.
3.

A simplifying but not necessary assumption is that parents pro

duce for each child the same quality level, i.e. there are neither favor
ites nor Cinderellas .

Findings from this sample not reported in this

paper indicate that there are systematic differences in parental investment
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within families , represen ted by birth order.

These findings , however , do

not alter the conclusi ons which follow from the analysis in this paper,
as long as size effects dominate birth-or der effects sufficie ntly so that,
for example~ even in cases where early children receive greater resource s
than middle children , they still receive less than they would have, on
12
Birth-o rder differen ces can
average , in the absence of other children .
be shown to be consiste nt with the quality- quantity model as long as
parenta l time is a binding constrai nt within periods of childrea ring.
III.

13

Empiric al framewo rk and results
RE?sults below are based on househo lds in which both husband and

wife are present.

Estimate s of educatio nal investm ent are further con

fined either to househo lds with at least one child between the ages of
6 and 18 or househo lds with at least one child between the ages of 6
14 Followin g a descript ion of
·
and 22, between 1200 and 1500 househo lds.
variable s, results are presente d and discusse d in the followin g order:
A.

Ordinary least squares regressi ons in which the dependen t variable

is one of several measures of parenta l investm ent in child schoolin g,
with number of children present in the househo ld entered as an explana
tory variable along with other househo ld charact eristics .
B.

Reduced -form estimate s of regressi ons of parent charact eristics

on parenta l investm ent in children , and on the demand for children .
C.

Estimati on by two-stag e least squares of an investme nt equation ,

in which fertilit y is entered as an endogeno us variable on the right
hand side.
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Description of variables
Table 1 lists variables used in regressions, with means and standard
deviations for the sample of households with at least one child aged 6 to 18.
Several measures of parental investment in the schooling of children are
The simplest is the total amount of spending reported on education

used.

(TOTED).

Similar is the share of the household's total budget going to

education (BUDSHED).

A serious shortcoming of these variables as measures

of parental investment is that educational costs parents face may differ
ffY age and sex of children; declining expenditure with increasing family

size could thus overestimate or underestimate the effect of siblings on
per-child investment, depending on whether larger families tend to have
more or fewer older children (assuming older children cost more to keep
in school, which is generally the case in Colombia, where most primary
schools are public, but most iecondary schools private and tuition-charging).

15

Household expenditures on education should thus be standardized

for age and sex of children present.

Moreover, for a measure of average

costs by age and sex, household expenditures on education should be esti
mated for enrolled children only, since dropout rates increase with age.
Unfortunately, interviewees were not asked whether children were
currently enrolled, but only what amount of school children had completed.
I therefore compared age and educational attainment to designate children
as currently enrolled or not.

Predicted expenditures by age-sex category

were then estimated as a function of a regression of household educational
expenditures on children "enrolled."

(Various age standards tried and

sets of predicted expenditures are shown in the Appendix.

By any of these
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TABLE 1
Variabl e definiti ons and descrip tive statisti cs for samnle
of househo lds with at least one child aged 6 to 1B, N=14JJ

Mean
TOTED
BUDSHED

SC

EDI
CHL
ARAT

LYH
SCH

sew
· MIGD

YSBC

BOOD
CAW
MEDD

AGW
AGSW

Total household spending on educatio n(l968 pesos, 64.8
quarterl v)
.05
Share of household budget spent on educatio n
.40
Family score (relativ e to other househo lds)
n
educatio
on
tures
using current expendi
1.05
Family educatio nal index (relativ e to other
nal
educatio
n's
childre
using
lds)
househo
attainm ent
4,77
Number of children of wife current ly alive
.59
Fertilit y measure, based on chi-ldre n-ever
undity
age-fec
the
for
ized
born, standard
relation ship using a natural fertilit y
.schedul e
·6.J
Natural log of husband 's income(1968 pesos,
quarterl y)
7.2
Husband 's number of years of schoolin g
completed
6.J
Wife's number of years of schoolin g complete d
.10
Migrant durrany. Equals one if househo ld
Colombia
members arrived from anywhere in
other than Bogota, Medelli n, Cali or
Barranq uilla within the last 5 years
7.5
Number of years househo ld members have resided
for
8
or
5,
to
1
Equals
in current city.
·
more than 5
.29
Bogota dummy. Equals one if current city
of residenc e is Bogota
.21
Cali dwmny
Medelli n dwmny
Age of wife
Age of wife-sch ooling of wife interac tion term

.25

J6.4
208.

Standar d
Deviatio n
107.8
.05

~73
.945

J.05

.29

.92
4.6

4.2
.Jl

1.7

.45
.41
.43
8·.4
185.
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~tandards, enro:lment probabilities decline monotonically from above
90 percent at age 9 to about 35 percent at age 17.

Since parameter

estimates using four different resulting "scores" for each household
do not differ markedly, only the results using one of the computed scores
are reported.)

The resulting predicted expenditure for each household,

depending on the age and sex of its children, is then the denominator
in the dependent variable:

SC

EXEDj = actual
= _ _...,_.._
PREDJ
j
nj

total expendituresj

,.. expenditur.ei
XS
i~l

in which j denotes the household, i the children in the household, x the
ages 6,7 • • • 18, ands male or female.

Each household's score is thus

the ratio of its actual educational expenditure on education to its pre
dicted expenditure.

This score is calculated only for families with at

least one child between ages 6 and 18 and no older children at home;
this is because older children might affect the numerator but are not
taken into account in the denominator.

The same procedure is then follow-

ed for all families with children between ages 6 and 22.

16

An alternative method of measuring a family's investment in education

is to compare households according to their children's educational attainment alone,

17

without consideration of actual direct money expenditures,

using as the dependent variable an index of the household's educational
achievement relative to others in the sample with children in the same
i es. 18
.
age-sex categor

-14-

EDij

R

~j educationix sj

i=l educationiXS
In the denominator is the mean educational attainment of children in the
sample, by age and sex (shown in Table 2), and in the numerator household
The index may be overstated for families with

j's children's attainment.

children in younger age groups (some of whom will drop out) ;still in an
ordinary least squares regression on this dependent variable in which
mother's age was included, the coefficient on age was not statistical ly
significant , and the coefficient was not negative, as we.might expect,
but positive.

On the one hand, the index understates the efforts of

families whose children repeat years of school, and thus for their age
have completed fewer years; children who start late also depress the
index for their

household.

On the other hand, late starters and repeat

ers could well reflect differences in preschool and during-scho ol invest
ments by parents of time and other inputs.
Differences in regression results for the two dependent variables
indicate whether parents respond to the financial pressures of schooling
primarily by removing children from school or primarily by spending less
on education of children while keeping them enrolled.
differ in another respect as well.

The two variables

The first measures current spending

on education; the second reflects to some extent a whole series of past
spending decisions, which have produced a certain level of educational
attainment for children.

Thus differences in them may also provide some

insight into how patterns of investment change as the economic situation
of households changes, as will be seen below.

.
-15...
TABLE 2
Mean Educa tional Attain ment in Years of School
Canple ted by Age and E>ex *

~

Boys

Girls

6

.18

.25

7

.60

.68

8

l.20

l.2J

9

1.78

1.74

10

2.40

2.60

11

J.16

J.J8

12

4.02

4.32

13

5.17

5.10

14

5.87

6.01

15

6."74

7.18

16

. 7.53

7.94

17

7.71

8.01

18

8.08

9.61

*

The sample includ es-mo re than 100 person s in each
age-se x cate~o ry.
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Two different measures of fertility are also used.

In a standard

budget analysis, the number of children currently being supported might
be viewed as best C?pturing the constraint on educational spending children
may present.

However, from a lifetime planning point of view, children

currently living at home is not the correct variable.

On the

one

hand, older

children who have left the household could be contributing to household
income and thus influencing current expenditures on education of children
still at home positively.

On the other hand, they could affect negatively

household expenditures on education of children still present, if they
contributed to an earlier depletion of resources allocated by parents
for children's education.

Moreover, the age at which children leave

home itself depends on parental investments in their education, and is
thus endogenous.
is -preferable.

For these reasons, a measure of completed family size
Two are used.

One is children currently alive; it is

assumed to represent the best measure of household's desired number of
children, as well as the best indicator of number of children. in terms
of the effect of family size on investments in children, assuming mortality
does not vary systematically across households.

Both these assumptions

are based on the premise that most children who die do so in infancy, so
19
and so that their existence
that parents can replace them if they wish,
does not affect strongly investment-per -child.

(Ideally children-ever

born would be used, and an additional equation representing child mortality
would be entered into the structural system; however this would make the
identification problem discussed below even more serious.)
The second measure of fertility, ARAT (age ratio), is standardized

-17-

for mother's age using a natural fertility schedule.

20

Its principal

effect is to purge the fertility variable of differences in fertility
by age of mother due solely to biological effects.

This variable is

based on children-ev er-born to the wife, not children alive.
The income variable used is the natural log of income of the husband.
Income of the husband is preferred to total household income because
hours and type of work of the husband (in cases where he heads the house
hold) are less likely to be affected by the family's composition than
those of the wife.

In this way, any contribution children make to total

~

income is also excluded.

21

The relation of income to both household fertility and household
educational investment is assumed to be nonlinear; for this reason the
natural log of income is used in all regressions . The log form has the
effect of imposing diminishin 9 returns to higher income.

In the invest

ment regressions , the resulting semilog function implies that the income
elasticity of educational spending declines toward zero, allowing for
saturation.

This is not a bad approximati on over most levels of income,

assuming parents perceive diminishing returns to educational expenditure s
per child.

To produce human capital, education purchased in the market

must be combined for each child with innate ability and child time, so
that diminishing returns to market expenditure s on per-child education
are not unlikely.
Education of husband and wife are continuous variables, i.e. years
of schooling completed.

Differences in type of education (e.g. post

secondary vocational vs. university) are not distinguish ed.
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The date includes informatio_~ on the m.nnber of years a family had
resided in its city of residence at the time of the survey, up to five
years, with families living in that city more than five years lumped
together.

For those who had arrived within the preceding five years,

there is information on whether prior residence was one of the other of
the four cities sampled, elsewhere in Colombia, or outside of Colombia.
Families which had arrived in one of the four cities from elsewhere in
Colombia within the five years preceding the survey are classified as
migrants (MIGD).

A second migrant variable, YSBC (years since in big

city) is continuous, being between one and five, or for families in their
current city more than five years, being valued as eight.

Since the cities

sampled are the four largest in the country, families coming from else
where in Colombia would have come from rural areas or smaller cities.
Dwmnies are used representing the household's current city of resi
dence:

Bogota, Cali or Medellin, with Barranquilla the ex.eluded city.

Age of wife and the age of wife-schooling of wife interaction term,
and their

expected signs, are discussed with the regression results below.

Unfortunately, there is no explicit

information in this data set

as to whether children in the households surveyed were actually enrolled
in school at the time of the survey; what is known is the educational
attainment of children.

Thus it is impossible to do separate regressions

predicting enrollment, and impossible to do regressions predicting educa
tional spending conditional on enrollment.

However, as mentioned above,

a predictinn of expenditures by age-sex groups was constructed; using four
different sets of criteria for what level of education should have been

J
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reached by what age, four sets of calculated guesses as to wh~ther children
of specific ages were still enrolled were made (Appendix).

Using the

least demanding criteria of the four, about 25 percent of families with
children between the ages of 6 and 22 have no children enrolled--many of
these families may only have older children.

This figure corresponds

roughly to that of 20 percent of all families with children aged 6 to
18 which reported zero spending on education.
Table 3 is a matrix of simple correlations between the different
educational investment variables and fertility-relat ed yariables, for
families with at least one child aged six ·to eighteen.

Several variables

not described above (and not used in the_ regression analysis) are included.
ENRSC is a household enrollment score; using the least demanding age
attainment standard, it is the ratio of apparently enrolled children to
all children aged 6 to 22.
ing per child aged 6 to 18.

CEB is children ever born.

SPENDPC is spend

CH618 is number of children aged 6 to 18.

Not surprisingly, total spending on education (TOTED) is positive
ly correlated with the number of schoolage children, those aged 6 to 18.
It is very slightly negatively correlated with children ever born and
children alive.

Spending per child is negatively correlated with all

family size variables, and the age-standardize d indices of investment
per child (SC, EDI and ENRSC) are even more negatively correlated with
these variables.

A.

Ordinary least-squares analysis
Table 4 indicates the results of regressions of four different

TABLE J
Simple Corr elati ons

LYH
LYH
CEB

1

CEB

CHL

ARAT CH618 TOTED SPENDPC BUDSHED

-.19 -.10 -.21
l

CHL

!RAT

.003

.59

.59

.28

ENRSC

. 37

.55

-43

.84

.54

-.07

-.23

.009

-.16 -.23

-.2?

l

.57

.50

-.02

-.16

.05

-.11 -.16

-- .19

1

.41

-.14

-.26

-.09

-.17 -.21

-.19

.r6

-.lJ

.25

-.09 -.16

-.10

• 82

.65

.JO

.70

.Jl

1

.53

.41

.88

.J9

1

.26

.42

.21

1

.49

.48

1

.JJ

1

TOTED

SC

.66

1

CH618

EDI

SPENDPC
BUDSHED
EDI

SC

1

ElIBSC
N = 1433

For varia ble defin ition s, see Table 1 and p. 19.

.
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TABLE 4
es on Chi ldre n
OLS Reg ress ions of Inve stm ent Var iabl

Dependent
var iab le:

Tot al edu cati ona l
spending

Log of hus ban d's
inco me (LYH)

67.7
(27 .7)

Edu cati ona l

-.05 2

-1.1 3

.016 7
(11 .J)

( 14. 3)

-28 .5 'i
( 2. 3) ·
-12 .6

1

(1.5 ) ;
.712

CDJ

( .09)

· F = 1.58
7
-2.1 ; 8,14 37

CD5

·(.J O),

CD6

2.94

CD?

3.01

CDS

17.4
(1.4 2

(. 32)
(.J5 )

CD9 or more

.785
(.08 )
N =1447
R =.J6

*

CD

-2.1 4

.·414

.J60

(23. 7)

(1.0 7) ,

-.008.56,

.017 Ji

(

i

(1. 54)

.0122i

d.75)
3. 3.

.16)

• F = 2. 51
-.25 5
--.00 770 : 8,14 37

i
'

.002021;

(.36 )

.00093

I

(.18 )

.013 0
(1. 76)

.00525

(.90 )

N =1447
. R =.09

.0928,

I!

( .20)

.00123

c1. s >

( . 72) :

'

(1.7 )

( • 28)

-.0623!

-.1.'.35-,

-.01 677
I
(2,2 )

\

CD2

Edu cati ona l
exp end itur e
sco re - SC

Budget sha re atta inm ent
to edu cati on inde x - EDI

-364 .

con stan t

(4)

(3)

(2)

(1)

IIF

i
I

.OJ93

=

!l

I 8,14 37 -.18 2

l

c3. 56 )

-.07 581

-.22 6
(J.4 6)

c3. 43)

i

I

(.S O)·
-.21 6

( 2.43 )

- ..:n7

!

-.19 2

-.20 8

( 2. 52)
-.21 7
( 2.18 ) _,l

-.21 7
{3.1 7)

~

N =1447
R

=.32

e, 1 thro ugh 9 or more,
= dummy for number of chi ldre n aliv

lude d var iab le.
with hou seho lds with 4 chil dre n the exc
in par enth ese s.
The t-st atis tic for each coe ffic ien t is

;

( J. lJ)

( 2.40)

N =1447
R =.15

I

F = 6. 98
8,14 37
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depend£,t variables, all indicators of parents' educational investments
in children, on the income variable and a series of dummies representing
families with from one to nine or more children, with four-child house
holds the omitted variable.
educational spending.

In column 1, the dependent variable is total

The signs of the coefficients on the dummies indi

cate that, holding husband's income constant, total expenditures on
education increase steadily up through four-child households, and then
remain relatively constant.
Our real interest, though, is the relationship between additional
children and per-child, rather than total, spending.

Table 5 shows the

results of calculations of changes in per-child spending with addition-

al children based on the column (1) regression, Table 4.

22

Figures

1 and 2 indicate the shape of the relationship between number of children
and both total spending and per-child spending.

Additional children are

clearly associated with declining per-child expenditures.
The column (2), Table 4 regression has as the dependent variable
the share of a household's total expenditures in the period going to
education.

The mean share for the sample is slightly over five percent.

It is somewhat lower for families with one or two children, and then
remains the same, regardless of how laLge the family becomes.

The results

are similar if dummies for only those children currently living at home
are used (not shown).

Thus families retain a certain proportion of spend

ing on education, even as increasing family size makes othe~ demands on
the budget; with a fixed proportion, per-child spending necessarily falls
as family size increases.

-23TABLE 5
Per-Child Education al Expenditu res by ~ize or Family
Per-child expenditu res, based *
on regressio n in Table 4, Col. 1

Number of Children

J5.5

l

3
4
5

25. 7
21.6
16.0
12.4

6
7
8

10.2

2

11.2

9.6
~

9 or more

FIGURE 2
ner-Child ~ducation al Snending and

FIGURE 1
Total Education al Spending anc Num'-ler o"
Olil"'ren

.

Total spending
80

Number of ChilcirFl!n

Per.:.child spending
40

.

70

35

60

JO

50

25

40
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30
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20

10.
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5

l

2

J

4

5

6

7.2

7 8 9
Number of
children

•
l

2

J

4

5

6

•Amounts are equal to coefficie nt on LYH times menn LYH plus the
(negative ) constant, all divided by 4 for the 4-child family; for
other family sizes, the coefficie nt on CD 1 {i=l,2,J, 5,6,7,8,9 or more)
is added, and the resulting figure divided by i•l,2,J,5 ,6,7,8,9 .

7 8 9
Nl.!1'1ber of
children
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In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 are similar regressions , using the
age-standar dized dependent variables.

A similar pattern is evident, as

illustrated in Figures 3, 4 and 5 on page 25.

Parents are able to maintain

per-child educational investmen~ as family size increases up to three or
four children; a significant drop in investment scores occurs with five or
more children.
The F-tests shown in Table 4 indicate that as a group the child
durranies are significant at the 1 percent level in columns 2, 3 and 4,
hut fall short of significanc e at 5 percent in column 1.
The results of these regressions , however, must be interpreted
with caution, as at most indicating how number of children and investment
On the one hand, we have not controlled

in children are correlated.

for parents' education or migrant status.

If less-educate d or migrant

parents have more children and spend less on education, the "cost of siblings"
effect could be spurious.
number of children.

A more serious problem is the endogeneity of

An investment equation is better estimated as part

of a system representing the parents' simultaneou s decisions regarding
23
family size and investment, i.e., in linearized form:
N = a

0

0 = B

0

+ a

+

1

O

B/!

+ a

+

SCW
2

s2scw

+ a

+

SCH
3

s3.scH

LYH
4

+

s LYH

+

+ a

+

4

ra.z.
l l

+

£1

rs .w.

+

£2

i

j J J

where N is the fertility variable, Q is the variable representing invest
ment in education per child, SCW, SCH and LYH are the educational attain
ment of the wife, educational attainment of the husband, and log of income
of the husband, the Zi are variables which influence number of children but

-25FIGURES 3, 4 , 5
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not investment per child, and Wj are variables which influence investment
per child, but not the number of children.

An OLS estimate of the Q equa

tion will result in parameter estimates which are biased, for two possible
reasons.
a.

Assuming N and Qare substitutes, the coefficient on N will be

negatively correlated with e:

and thus biased downward.

2

The shadow price

of investment per child is lower for parents with fewer children.
b.
clear.

e:

1

and e:

2

may be correlated, though in what direction is not

We do not observe individual differences in fecundity nor in
A preference for large numbers of children could be

parental tastes.

positively or negatively related to a preference for child-oriented
patterns of expenditure.

Positive correlation between e:

1

and e: 2 could

offset the negative bias of the number of children coefficient in equa
tion (2); negative correlation, would increase further the bias.
For these reasons, we turn to reduced-form and two-stage least
squares estimates.

B.

Reduced-form estimates
The two structural equations above are estimated as reduced-forms:

N =

ylO

+

yll sew +

y 12SCH +

AG\'/ +
ylJ LYH + 'Y 14M + y 15

3
1
+ ell
. '' +. . r 1 y 1 U.
yl6 AGS"
l
.
l
1.=

0 = ..,,20 + -,,
21

scw

+

y 22SCH

+

y 23 LYH

+ y

J
M+ L
24
i=l

Yi·i 1

+

c21
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where Mis one of the two variables indicating the household's migration
status, AGW and AGSW are age of wife and an age of wife-schooling of wife
interaction term, and Ui are the city dummies (BOGD, CALD, MEDD).
In interpreting the signs and overall magnitudes of the reducedform coefficients, it is important to take into account predictions from
theory of their signs in the structural equations for N and Q.

Even apart

from direct estimation of the structural equations, we can use the theoreti
cal predictions to improve interpretation of the reduced-form coefficients.
For example,

r 21 , r 22

and

r 23 ,

the reduced-form coefficients on mother's

and father's education and father's income, are equal to:
=(Ba

1 2

+

B )/(1-S a )

2

1 1

Looking, then, first at coefficient signs in the structural equations,
the following comments can be made:
Given the assumption that parents treat N and Q as substitutes, we
expect a

1

and

s1

to be negative.

a

2

will be negative insofar as wife's

education represents the value of her time and the wife bears sufficient
responsibility for care of children.

The signs of a

4

and

e4

are not known

a priori; additional income could increase either Nor Q or possibly both.
A prevailing assumption is that the true income elasticity of Q is positive,
so that the observed income elasticity,

e4 ,

is likely to be positive, unless

the true income elasticity of N is s~fficiently greater than that of Q.
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Moreover,

e4

will be influence d positivel y if capital ""'larkets are imper

fect, and parents with higher income are better able to finance invest
ments in their children.

The observed income elasticit y of number of

children (a ) is generally less likely to be positive; even if the true
4
elasticit y is positive, the interactio n between N and Q will cause a down
ward bias, and could make a

negative.
4
Insofar as we view Q, the dependent variable in the investmen t equa

tion, as "quality" per child in the general sense of the wocd, and not
specifica lly as investmen t in schooling per child, the signs of

e3 ,

e2

and

the coefficie nts on the education of parents, are not theoretic ally

obvious.

On the one hand, parents with more education are likely to have

greater access to informati on on the returns to investmen t in schooling ,
an allocativ e effect of the parents' education , as well as to have greater taste for education in their children.

On the other hand, as parents'

education increases , the value of their own time increases concomita ntly,
so that if we include in Q parents' own time spent with children, at least
the parent-tim e component of investmen t might decrease with parents' educa
tion.

Another twist, however:

even as parent inputs measured in time-unit s

might decrease with parents' education , if parents with more education are
more efficient users of their own time with their children, parents' time
measured in efficienc y or value units might be constant or increase, even

given a drop in actual time spent with children, as parents' education
increases .

Evidence from empirical studies indicates that parents with

greater education do seem to invest more of their own time in their children.
Interpret ation of the evidence differs as to whether high-educ ation parents
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manage this primarily by having smalle~ families (thus increasing per
child inputs of time even as total childrearing time is held constant or
reduced), or by actually spending more hours in toto in childrearing.

24

In this empirical analysis, the measure of investment per child is
expenditures on schooling per child and children's schooling attainment.
Since parents' time does not enter directly into schooling--in fact
schooling may be a substitute for parents' time--8

2

and

s3

will probably

be positive, either because of the taste effect or allocative effect of
parents' education, or because parents substitute purchase of schooling
for their own time in providing education to children.
!urning then to expectations regarding the reduced-forms, note that
with B and a both negative it is clear that in the reduced-form invest
1
1
ment equation, the coefficient on mother's education must be greater than
the structural effect of mother's education on child investment.
trast, if a

3

In con

(the coefficient of father's education on N) is close to

zero, as is a common assumption, i.e. that the price of father's time
does not affect demand for children, then the reduced-form coefficient
on father's education is, relative to that on mother's education, closer
to representing the true structural effect of father's education on invest
ment in children.

Such a contrast may explain the not uncommon finding

that mother's education affects child quality more than father's education,
a result usually attributed to the presumed greater amount of time mothers
spend with children.

Similarly, if the structural effect of income is

positive (a >0) in the demand for children equation, it will bias down
4
ward the coefficient on income in the reduced-form investment equation.
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1.

Fertility results
Table 6 shows the results of reduced-form estimation of the fertili

ty equation, with the number of children alive the dependent variable in
columns 1 and 2, and ARAT the dependent variable in columns 3 and 4.
The coefficient of age of wife in the children alive equation (col
umns 1 and 2) is positive as expected, reflecting the longer exposure to
the risk of pregnancy, and possibly some cohort effect--that older women
have higher fertility even on an age-specific basis (which is likely
since the fertility rate in Colombia has been declining).

In the ARAT

regressions, where the biological factor of increased exposure to pregnancy
is controlled for, any cohort effect is apparently swamped by a strong
life-cycle effect, i.e. relative to the possibilities of childbearing,
Colombian women restrict fertility significantly in the latter part of
their childbearing years.
Education of the wife and husband both depress fertility.

In all

cases the magnitude of the coefficient on wife's education is greater;
since the wife usually is the partner primarily responsible for child
rearing in Colombia, this result is consistent with the theory that
fertility is influenced by parents' price of time.

Education may also

represent a lower information cost of using contraceptives effectively.
Income of the husband has a statistically significant positive
effect on children alive; its sign is positive but not significant in
the ARAT regressions.

(The A.RAT measure is based on children-ever-b orn;

income might affect it less if the principal effect of higher income is
to suppress infant and child mortality.)

The income results indicate
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TABLE 6
Reduced-Form Fert ility Regr essio ns
(n = 2346)

Col. 2
Col. 1
able :
vari
t
nden
depe
e
Aliv
child f~n~

Expl anato ry
Vari ables

Col. 4
Col. J
:
able
vari
t
nden
depe
ARAT

CONSTANT

2.42
(3.8 5)

1.23
( 2. 27)

0.81 6
(12. 7)

0.66 9
(11. 5)

~w

-0.17 6
(-J. 74)

-0.17 9
(-J. 82)

-0.01 88
(-J.9 0)

-0.01 87
(- J. 92)

SOi

-0.11 1
(-5.8 1)

-0.10 9
(-5.7 7)

-0.01 2
(-6.2 5)

-0.01 20
(-6.2 2)

LYH

0.33 8
( J. 8J)

0.335
( J. 81)

0.01 65
(1.8 3)

AGW

0.05 6
( 6.69 )

0.05 4
(9.4 9)

-0.00 209
(-2.4 6)

AG.C,W

0.002 58
(2.2 0)

0.00 26J
(2.2 6)

YSBC

\

0.000 192
(l.61 )

0.016 2
(1. 82)

-0.00 228
(-2.7 0)
0.001 85
(l. 56)

-0.01 95
(-4.9 9)

-0.1 J2
(-J.4 4)

MIGD

0.85 J
( J. 92)

0.11 6
( 5.24 )

BOJD

0.24 8
(1.4 3)

-0.01 37
(-0. 78)

CALD

-0. 340
(-l.8 4)

-0.06 4
(-J.4 2)

MEDD

0.60 6
( J.40 )

0.061 5
(J.4 0)

The t-sta tisti c for each coef ficie nt is
in pare nthe ses.
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a notable income effect on quantity of children, once parents' education,
representing price-of-time, is controlled. 25

This indicates that during

this period in Colombia, the income elasticity of quantity of children
was not necessarily less (or if less, not substantially less) than the
income elasticity of quality of children.

Thus reductions in familv size

must be due directly to the price effect of increasing value of parents'
time, rather than to upward shifts in the taste for quality in children.
This is consistent with the structural estimation result (discussed below)
showing a direct causal link from lower fertility to greater per-child
investment. The similarly positive effect of income on per-child invest
ment (Table 7) demonstrates that the income effect can be simultaneously
positive on both quantity and quality in children.
The age of wife-schooling of wife interaction term is positive
and statistically significant in the children alive regression.

This is

somewhat surprising, since we might expect the positive effect cf age to
be attenua·ted, rather than increased, by increased schooling (if for
example the more-educated of the older women had been better able to process new information regarding contraceptives in the early 1960s).
are two possible reasons:

There

one is a timing effect; more-educated women

delay childbearing, but then space births closely so as to concentrate
the period of childbearing; thus at somewhat earlier ages they may have
what is temporarily higher fertility than their less-schooled contemporaries.
A second possibility is that for ·those older women with more ·education,
infant mortality was not as high as for their contemporaries; this is
consistent with the fact that the interaction term is less positive
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and not significant (at the 5 percent level) in the ARAT regression,
ARAT being based on children-ever-b orn rather than children currently alive.
2.

Investment results
The per-child educational investment regressions are shown in

Table 7 for the two dependent variables described above:

SC (family's

score relative to other families in terms of current spending on educa
tion, standardized for expected expenditure given the age and sex of their
children) and EDI (family's educational index, based on children's educa
tional attainment compared to others in their age-sex group).

A comparison

of the effect of the independent variables on number-of-child ren and on
investment-per -child is instructive.

Education of parents has the expect

ed opposite effects, reducing fertility and increasing investment.

As

noted above, the direct effect of the mother's education on investment,
will be overestimated in the reduced-form if, as seems the case, her
education reduces fertility.

On the other hand, income has a strong

positive effect on both N and Q; thus its direct effect on one or both
is underestimated in these reduced-forms.
YSBC (years since the household arrived in one of the four big cities)
and MIGD (migrant dummy) are a continuous and discrete version of the
same variable (with the expected signs reversed), and by definition should
have opposite effects in the fertility and investment regressions.

As

expected, recent migrants have higher fertility and lower investment
than longer-term residents, though again from the reduced-forms we cannot tell to what extent the fertility behavior influences investment behavior,

TABLE 7
Reduceu-Form Regressions of Per-Child Educational Investment
(n-= 1255)

Explanatory
Variables
CONSTANT

Col. 2
Col. 1
dependent variable:
SC (expenditure
score )1
-1.91
(-12.J)

-1.76
(-12.4)

Col. 4
Col. 3
depE!lJdent variable:
EDI (_educationab
attainment score)
-0.85J

. {-J.93)

-0. 551
(-2.80)

sew

0.0358
{6.13)

0.0341
( 5. 77)

0.0J88
{4. 76)

0.0346
(4.21)

SCH

0.0188
{ J .37)

0.0193
( J.46)

0.0315
(4.05)

0.0326
(4.21)

0.186

0.195
( 5. 54)

LYH
YfiBC

MIGD

0.287
(11. 7)

0.289
(11.4)

0.0167
(1.66)

(5.JO)
0.0304
(2.16)

-0.152
(-l.9J)

-0.0878
( 'T'l. 55)

--

. -0.0270
(-0.411)

BOGD

0.0254
( 0.536)

CALD

-0.0824
(-l.61)

. -0.127
(-1. 79)

MEDD

-0.0307
(-0.621)

-0.244
(-3.55)

1For families with a child between 6 and 18 years, using score #4,
as derived in the Appendix.
2ror families with a child between 6 and 18 years.
The t-statistic for each coefficient is in parentheses.
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and vice versa.

Interestingly, the effect of migrant status on current

expenditures (Table 7, columns 1 and 2) is not statistically significant
at the five percent level, though the effect on their children's overall
educational attainment is.

This is as we might expect:

the latter depend

ent variable reflects a series of past decisions regarding schooling,
many made presumably in the rural environment.

The current spending

variable better reflects the migrant households' current urban environ
ment, indicating migrant households act like other households in terms of
their current spending, so that there must be a rapid catch-up effect
operating on their children's educational achievement. 26
The city dummies (Bogota, Cali, Medellin, with Barranquilla the
omitted category) generally have contrary effects as would be expected,
on the two dependent variables, though not always, indicating there are
price differences either for schooling (e.g. tuition fees) or births
(e.g. contraceptive costs) across the cities which attenuate the simple
negative correlation between N and Q.

Medellin is clearly a high-fertili

ty low-investment city relative to Bogota and Barranquilla.

Cali

exhibits

lower fertility but lower investment (the latter not at statistically
significant levels) as well.

The Medellin result may reflect greater

continuing attachment to surrounding rural regions in Medellin, which
is the major city in the smallholding coffee region of Colombia 27; in
any event more investigation of these clear effects of differing economic
or social environments is warranted.

In these reduced-forms, it is not

possible to isolate whether, for example, Medellin residents have com
paratively high-fertility and low per-child investment because high
fertility causes low investment, low investment causes high fertility,
or both are caused by other factors.
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C.

Two-stag e least squares estimate s
Finally , I present two-stag e least squares estimate s of the invest

ment equation suggeste d by the jointly- determi ned model:

N= a

Q

+ a

o

1 1

+ a

2

SCW

O = B + 8 N + s scw
0
1
2

+ a

+

SCJ
3

s3scJ

+ a

+

LYH + ta.Z.
i l l

4

s4LYH

+

ta.W.

j J J

+ t
1
+ t

2

These estimate s of the Q equation above, in contrast to the ordinary least
squares estimate s in section A, have the statisti cal property of consist
ency, since the fertilit y variable , N, is treated as endogen ous.
Unfortu nately, estimati on of this system is by no means straigh t
forward, because of the difficul ty of identify ing the two equation s.

It

is the Zi and Wj, i.e. those v~riable s represen ting respecti vely factors
which influenc e number of children but not investme nt per child, and vice
versa, which would permit identifi cation of the equation s.

The fertilit y

equation is virtuall y impossib le to identify in any data set; an identi
fying variable would be some proxy for the fixed costs of quality in
children , i.e. a cost unassoc iated with number of children .

(If parents

were not allowed to move, an exogenou s increase in, for example , the pro
perty tax which f\lllded local schoolin g, would qualify, since all househo lds
pay the tax, regardle ss of number of children . 28 ) Thus the structu ral fertility equation is not estimate d at all.

The ideal identify ing variable

for the investm ent equation is the cost of contrace ptives; lower contra
ceptive costs cause a relative increase in the fixed cost of child nuni>ers
at a given rate of sexual intercou rse.

The investm ent equation is identifi ed

in two ways. _One is the use of a schoolin g age-of-w ife interact ion term
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in the fertility equation; this term probably reflects differences in
timing of births due to differing price of time constraints for women
by education.

Timing of births will not affect educational investment

(independent of income and other parent characteristics).

Secondly, the

two variables representing whether parents recently migrated to one of·
the four large cities are entered into the fertility equation, on the
grounds that the cost of obtaining and using generally less-accessible
contraceptives was less in these cities than elsewhere in Colombia.

In

sofar as this could also be true for obtaining education for children,
the assumption that these migration-related variables affect fertility
but not educational investment is a weak one.

However, it is more justi

fiably excluded from that investment equation where the dependent variable
is current spending, than from that equation where the dependent variable
reflects to a greater extent past investment, i.e. where it is educational
attainment to date of children.

Thus two-stage least squares is used only

to estimate the investment equation in which the dependent variable is
cur~ent spending.
In Table 8 are the results from estimating this structural investment
equation in which the dependent variable is the household's "score" rela
tive to other households in the sample on current spending on education,
standardized for each household in terms of the ages and sexes of children
aged 6 to 22 (columns 1 to 3) and 6 to 18 (columns 4 to 6).

The column 1

regression, using children alive, indicates a clear negative effect of
number of children on per-child spending, as predicted.

The coefficient

of the alternative fertility measure, ARAT, is not statistically significant
(and is of the wrong sign) in column 2, probably reflecting the difficulty

TABLE 8
Regressions on Household Educational Expenditure Scores
Col. 1
(2SLS)
Explantory
Variables

Col. 2
( 2SLS) ..

Households with at least one
child aged 6 to 22
(n rz 1559)

Col. 3
(ir1'Strumental
:llai::I ah l e es timat.e.L.-

Col. 4
(2SLS)

Col. 5
(2SLS)

Col. 6
(instrumental
variables estimate)
Households with at least one child aged
6 to 18, and none aged 19 to 22.
(n = 1255)

CONSTANT

-1.395
(-7. 79)

-2.02
(-7.91)

-1. 273
(-4 .11)

-1.483
(-5.99)

-2.019
(-7. 50)

-1.187
(-3.33)

sew

0.0254
( 4. 26)

0.034
(6 .02)

0.0244
(3.52)

0 .0310
(4.60)

0 .0375
(6.04).

0.0259
(3.28)

SCH

0.00997
(1.58} ·

0.025
(3. 92)

0 .0134
(2.10)

0.0138
(2.10)

0.0213
( 3. 41)

0.00996
(1.36)

o. 303
· (12.4)

LYH
CHL

*

ARAT

-0.075
(-2. 70)

*

0.280
(12.5)

**

0.295
(11. 3)

--

--

-0.0585
(-1. 54)

0.357

--

--

(1. 26)

ARAT

o. 277
(12. 7)

0. 295
(11.1)

--

*Endogenous variables in two-stage least squares estimation. See text.
variables, predicted using larger sample.

--

0.261
(.960)

-0.676
(-1.63)
2
R • .34
The t-statistic for each coefficient is in parentheses.

**Endogenous

0.287
(11.4)

See text.

-0.874
(-1.85)
R2 • .34

I
l.,J

00

I

of identifying the investment equation and the sensitivity of estimates
to the identification procedure.

The regression in column 3 is based on

use of an instrumental variable, predicted ARAT, estimated using the sample
of all households, including those with no schoolage children and those
with no children at all.

Such use of an instrumental variable based on

a prediction from a different sample (columns 3 and 6) produces estimates

which are inconsistent in the statistical sense; on the other hand, the
endogenous fertility variables in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5, from the sample
including only households with schoolage children, are .derived from the
first stage of a two-stage estimation technique which contains sample bias
(however, this does not make the structural estimates of Table 8 inconsistent).
At any rate, probably because predicted ARAT from the full sample takes
account of the additional information regarding demand for fertility, it
is of the expected negative sign and close to significance in the column 3
equation.
The same regressions are shown for the smaller sample of households
with children 6 to 18 years old, and none older.

The coefficients on

children alive in column 4 and on the predicted fertility variable in
column 6 are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but
are of the same sign as in the columns 1 and 3 regressions.
The positive effect of income is only slightly greater in this
structural equation than in the reduced-form investment equation.

Inso

far as the true structural effect is well-reflected in the investment
reduced-form, we can assume its true effect is underestimated in the
fertility reduced-form, .again pointing to a positive income elasticity
for numbers of children.
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In these regressions, in contrast to the reduced forms, the .~ffect
of parents' education on investment can be interpreted as structural,
purged of additional positive effects education may have on Q through
its negative effect on N.

The coefficient on wife's education continues

to be greater than that on

husband's, contradicting the expectation that

its greater magnitude in the reduced form reflected primarily its theoreti
cally stronger negative effect on N.

However, husband's education is high

ly correlated with his income, dictating caution in comparing coefficients
on husband's and wife's education.
The results confirm
ment per child.

a causal .effect of number of children on .invest

Since the dependent variable is a score relative to

other households, and since relative shifts in the score will vary for
children at different ages, it is difficult to specify the negative effect
of siblings in terms of years of schooling lost.

However, based on the

coefficient of the log of income (.303) and of children alive (-0.075),
evaluated at the means

of the variables

an increase of one in the

number of children causes a 20 percent reduction in the family's score;
to offset that reduction would require about a 30 percent increase in
husband's income, from 614 (the antilog of the mean log of income) to
804 pesos quarterly.
"cost of siblings."

29

This result points to a not inconsiderable

The result is consistent with the model linking

quality and quantity, and despite identification problems, indicates
clearly that large family size causes a reduction in parental investment
per child.

To the extent that large families are more prevalent among

poor families with less-educated parents, lower per-child investments by
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such families may perpetuate poverty i~om one generation to the next.
On the other hand, exogenous changes in prices parents face which would
reduce fertility, would lead to concomitant increases in investment;
similarly if the costs of investment were exogenously reduced, fertility
could fall.

•

APPENDIX .
11
DESIGNATION OF "ENROLLED CHILDREN AND RE.cmLTS OF REGREt;SlONS
OF HOUSEHOID EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITIJRES ON ENROLLFD
CHILDREN BY AGE AND f>EX

ted,
Four differ ent age standa rds for educa tional att~in ment were attemp

as outlin ed. in the follow ing table:
Defin itely
enroll ed

Probab ly
enroll ed

6

6

7
8
9

7-P.

More defin itely
enroll ed

Less probab ly
enroll ed

OT educa tion

>

knows alphab et
1
2

3
4
6

10
11-12

7

lJ

8

14
15
16
17
18
19

9
10
11
12
13
14.
15
16
16

20

21
22

9
10
11-1,2

lJ

14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
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6
6-7

7-8

8.

9
10
11
12

9
10
11
12
13
14.
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
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The resulting predicted costs by age-sex category are based on the
equation:

where E ECDx

6

is a series of age-sex dummies for enrolled children, with

9 year old boys the excluded category.
The following matrices show predicted expenditures for each age-sex
category, based on the constant plus coefficients from the regressions
for definitely, probably and less probably enrolled (the more definitely
enrolled category appeared too stringent, based on the number of cases),
with the constant entered for nine-year old boys.

The number of households

with an enrolled child by each standard is also indicated.

An asterisk in

a box indicates that the corresponding coefficient was statistically signi
ficant at the 5 percent level.

J

-44-

Definitel y enrolled· ; number of children apparentl y enrolled by this definitio n is 1161.

Age
Sex

6

7

8

9

B

24

34

56

26

G

27

62•

76* 107*

6

?

8

9

B

26

J3

19

19

0

16

52*

46*

43

Sex

12

lJ

14

91* 94* 45 107* 109*
76 1 120*

53

73*

98 1

i5

16

17

18

80* 145* 164* 253*

19

20

21

22

75 203* 115 1 102*

65* 1741 llJ* 134* 112*

78*

82 200 1

17

18

12

lJ

14

15

16

54* 79*

J6

82*

58*

50

85* 116* 191*

59* 78*

Jl

47*

75*

58* 124*

10

11

84* 128*

19

20

68

215*

90*

BJ*

21

22

92* 113*
56

206*

number of children apparentl y enrolled by this defintion is 1316.•

Less probably enrolled·. ;

f

11

number of children apparentl y enrolled by this definitio n is 1409.

Probably enrolled ;
Age

10

Age
Sex

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

B

23

JJ

27

22

58*

80*

40 -104* 91* 77* 139* 162* 259*

G

22

56•

47*

51* 61*

82* 47

13

71*

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

65 200* 1061 106*

98* 65* 179* 106* 134* 110*

82•

86 190*

•
•
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Based·on these J sets of scores, 4 sets of predicted expenditure s
by age-sex category were used to obtain the denominator of 4 different

SCs.

These 4 sets, shown below, are a smoothed version of the 3 above,

and a 4th smoothed version of the first 3.

Regression results never

differed significant ly among the 4 scores.

Age

B

9 10 11 12 lJ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
8
7
6
40 40 40 40 70 70 70 90 90 90 150 150 200 125 125 125 125

G

50

50

6

7

8

B

25

25

25

G

Sex
.

Age
Sex

80

80

80

80

80 140 140 140 100 100 100 100

9 10 11

12

lJ

14

15

16 17 18 19

50 80

80

20

21

22

90 150 150 150 100 100

25

60

60

60

60

60

60

90

40 40

40 40

55

55

55

55

80

80

80 80 80

B

7
6
25 · 25

8
25

9
25

10 11 12 lJ
70 70 70 90

14
90

15
90

16 17 18 19 20 21 22
90 150 150 150 150 150 150

G

50

50

50

50 70 70 70 70 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110

Age

Sex

¼,e

80

80 100 100

16 17 18 19 20

21

22

lJ

14

15

?O 70 70 80

80

80 lJO lJO 150 lJO lJO lJO lJO

50 50 70 70 70 70

80

80 120 120 120 120 100 110 110

6

7

8

9

Sex
B

35

35

35

35

G

50

50

10 11 12
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FOOTNOTES

1niough this problem is not the concern of this paper, underinv est
ment may be caused simply because of an intergen erationa l externa lity,
apart from the presence or absence of siblings . Though the family is
posited as an institut ion which minimize s such underinv estment, parents
may stop short of a socially optimal level of investm ent in children .
The child might be willing to compens ate parents to invest directly in
him or her, but the parents would have no certaint y that the child would
repay them, and the child cannot borrow easily. Lazear (1975) develops
a model showing the likeliho od of such an externa lity; he points out
that parents may also underinv est in their own human capital if they
fail to take into account the returns to their children from their own
increase d capital.
2

zajonc (1976), Terhune (1974), Wray (1971), Lindert (1978, Ch. 6).
Number of siblings has also been linked to adults' occupat ional status
(Linder t 1978) and earnings (Bowles 1972). Simon and Pilarsk i (forth
coming), using a cross-se ction of countrie s, find only a very weak negative
relation between the proporti on of children in nationa l populati ons and per
child governm ent spending on educatio n, controll ing for per-cap ital income.
Such a finding using aggrega te data is not inconsi stent with reductio ns
in househo lds' private spending on per-chil d educatio n as number of children
increase s.
3
This data set, collecte d by the Center for the Study of Economic
Developm ent (CEDE), Universi dad de los Andes, Bogota, i.s describe d in
Prieto (1977) and Musgrove (1978, forthcom ing).
4

Such analyses of the Colombia data include Prieto (1977), Musgrove
(1978), and Rodrigue z and Gomez (1977). Brown and Deaton (1972) provide
a review of the literatu re on consumer budget analysis . Prais and Houthak ker
(1955) deal specific ally with family composi tion and economi es of scale
effects, developi ng and testing various computa tional techniqu es. See
also Sydenst ricker and King (1921) and Friedman (1952).
5

In a recent discussi on of expendi ture analyse s, Muellba uer (1977)
alludes to the fact that, though children constrai n current househo ld
consump tion, over the parents ' lifetime they more properly enter the
utility function , so that family size and composi tion are endogeno us
(p. 461).
6
1eibens tein (1975), Duesenb erry (1960), Caldwel l (1976). Easterli n,
with his "relativ e income" and "relativ e status" argumen ts (1973), attri
butes allocati on of resource s by parents between themselv es and children
to the parents ' own childhoo d experien ce, which he suggests influenc es
their aspirati ons for a certain standard of living for themselv es and for
spending on the quality of their children .
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An example of the logical error of assuming a direct causal link
between family size and child well-bein g is the following : Studies of
children' s consumpti on and work contribut ion in certain rural societies
suggest that under some circumsta nces children involve negative costs,
or positive value, to parents, at given rates of discount, time preferenc e,
etc. (Cain 1977, White 1973; Mueller (1976) comes to the opposite conclu
sion.) If we find that these children from large families who work on
their parents' small family farms receive less schooling than their urban
counterpa rts, should we conclude they receive less schooling because
they have many siblings? Clearly not--more likely they both have many
siblings and receive limited schooling because of the economic setting
in which they are raised. This is the implicatio n of an analysis of
fertility , schooling and children' s work contribut ion in India, by
Rosenzwei g and £venson (1977).
7
Analysis of the 1973 census indicates a rapid deGline in Colombian
fertility , beginning in the mid-sixti es. Fertility different ials by
residence (urban-ru ral) and education have been and continue to be con
siderable . However, the compositi on of the populatio n by residence and
education has changed considera bly. See Potter, Ordonez and Measham (1976).
8
Willis (19 73), Becker and Lewis (19 73). See also De Tray (1973).
Becker's 1965 article on the theory of time allocatio n fathered what
has come to be called the "new home economics " approach to studying the
effect of economic factors on fertility .
9

There is thus an important distinctio n between high-wage households in which all income is earned through labor, and high-incom e
household s where much or all income is from capital. In the latter
household s, increased income should be associate d unequivoc ally with
increased demand for child services, since there is no additiona l cost
of spending more time with children when additiona l income is not asso
ciated with working time of parents (assuming the wife works).
lOThis follows immediate ly from the first-ord er condition s for
maximizin g the utility function subject to the budget constrain t,
I= NQnC + Z1r . With the assumptio n of same quality of each child in
2
the household , the first-ord er condition s include: MU = AOn ·
MUQ =ANTIC; MU

N

= A11" •

- C'

Becker and Lewis, in discussin g price effects,
2
2
generaliz e the budget constrain t so that the shadow prices for N and Q
each contain a "fixed" component : I= NQ1rc ~·N1rN + Q1rQ + Z1r • The
2
shadow prices are then: PN = Q1rc + 1rN; PQ: Nnc + n ; P = 1r . It
2
2
0
is the fixed component s which in principle make it possible to identi
fy price effects on consumpti on of N and Q.
Rosenzwei g and Wolpin (1978) have shown that it is not possible to
distingui sh empirical ly between this model with interactio n between
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Q and N, and a simp le fixed pric e model
with out inter actio n, with out
some restr ictio ns on the char acte risti cs of
the utili ty func tion. They
use the rando m occu rrenc e of mult iple birth s
to repre sent vari ation in
the fixed pric e of Nin a cros s-sec tion of hous
ehold s; then with the
rest ricti on that both Q and Z are subs titut es
for N, they can test the
inte ract ive mode l. It is acce pted , given that
restr ictio n and given cer
tain boun ds on the cros s-pri ce elas ticit y betw
een PN and Q.

11

The prop ortio n of perso ns aged 12 to 19 enro
lled in · scho ol was
5 perc ent in 1951 , 12 perc ent in 1964 , and 24
perc ent in 1973 ; desp ite
rapid incre ases in the size of this popu latio
n the rate of incre ase in
prop ortio ns enro lled was high er in the late
sixt ies than in the fifti es.
Betw een 1950 and 1958 , spen ding at all leve ls
of gove rnme nt on educ ation
was abou t 22 perc ent of tota l spen ding ; betw
een 1958 and 1967 , the prop or
tion spen t on educ ation rose to abou t 45 perc
ent. (DANE, 1975 , p. 110
and 1971 , p. 128) .
12
Lind ert, 1978 , p. 195, finds using U.S. data
, that fami ly size
is a more impo rtant deter mina nt of pred icted
inpu ts into each child
than are birth orde r and spac ing.
13
Bird sall (197 8).
14

Samp le sizes also diffe r somewhat beca use of
miss ing data on
some vari able s; only male -head e1d hous ehold s
are inclu ded in the redu ced
form and two- stage leas t squa res estim ates;
for certa in inves tmen t regr es
sion s, fami lies with any child ren aged 19 to
22 were exclu ded, as such
child ren coul d affe ct the 6 to 18 year old base
d scor es.
15
We have no simp le way to meas ure the qual ity
of educ ation , and
use the stron g assum ption throu ghou t that pric
e diffe renc es in scho oling
refle ct qual ity diffe renc es, i.e. pare nts who
pay more get more .
16
Para mete r estim ates from regre ssion s using the
score calc ulate d
for child ren up to 22 do not diff er sign ifica
ntly in the redu ced-f orm
regr essio ns, and are not repo rted. They are
repo rted below in the one
case wher e they are diffe rent , using two- stage
leas t squa res.
17
The expe nditu re scor e varia ble capt ures to some
exte nt the oppo r
tuni ty cost to pare nts of keep ing thei r child
ren in scho ol and foreg oing
thei r home or labo r mark et cont ribu tion to the
hous ehold . Howe ver, in
this depe nden t vari able , these oppo rtuni ty cost
s are comb ined with dire ct
cost s. The two- stage leas t squa res estim ation
migh t there fore over state
the(n egat ive) effe ct of incre asin g fami ly size
if pare nts with more
child ren tend to subs titut e thei r own time for
mark et expe nditu res in
prod ucing thei r child ren's human capi tal. Sinc
e educ ation -at-h ome is
poss ible with grea ter econ omie s of sc.al e than
educ ation -at-s choo l, this
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is theoretically plausible. On the other hand, analy.-es of U.S. time
budget data have indicated that parents (generally of lower income) do not
increase overall time spent with children as number of children increases,
and thus do decrease time per child (even assuming some economies of
scale in time inputs to children). (Leibowitz 1974, Lindert 1978, Appen
dix C). Parents thus seem to treat time and goods as complements in the
production of child human capital. Furthermore it is likely that the
goods-intensive nature of children increases as children grow older so
that for school-age children, differences in money expenditures by family
size reflect fairly well differences in total parental investment, both
time and goods, in children. Gronau (1977) su~gests children are not
always home-time intensive: "Thus, while in the range where children's
goods are produced at home, an increase in wage increases the price of
children, when these goods are replaced by market goods, the increase
in wage reduces it . . . The goods-intensive nature of children becomes
more explicit as the child grows older .
" (pp. 30-31)
18

Rosenzweig (1977) uses this index for Indian data.

19

For parents to replace children who die requires that the demand
for surviving children be price inelastic; that it is inelastic is indicated where
evidence shows a positive association between child mortality and fertility. See Schultz (19 76).
20

Boulier and Rosenzweig ·(1978) suggest a measure of fertility which
is standardized for the age-fecundity relationship using an age-specific
natural fertility schedule and for exposure to the risk of conception
associated with marriage duration ("DRAT"). The measure used here,
"ARAT," is not standardized for marriage duration, since age at marriage
itself is endogenous in terms of the household decisionmaking process
being analyzed, e.g. better-educated women may choose to marry later.

21

The correlation between husband's income and total household income

is • 95.
22

s pen d'ing an d i ncome amounts are not annual,

b ut quarter 1y.

23

strictly speaking, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which
the coefficient on Nin the Q equation could be interpreted as a response
of parents to an exogenous change in N, multiple births beinf a possible
exception (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1978). But this system, with N endogenous,
provides a consistent estimate of the "effect" of a change in the "price" of
N, on Q.

24
Lindert (1974) interprets results of his U.S. data analysis as
indicating that higher-income, higher-status wives do not spend more
time in child care than lower-status counterparts. They do tend to spend
more time per child by having fewer children (pp. 67-69). There is no
evidence that higher-status mothers spend in toto less time, however.
Leibowitz (1974) finds more-educated mothers to be more efficient in
production at home of children's human capital.
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25 Since education
and income of husband are highly correlated

positively (.64), the positive income effect may reflect unexpected
income, or income over what a family anticipates , given the husband's
educ~tion. This result is consistent with Easterlin's relative income
hypothesis (Easterlin 1973) and with positive effects on fertility of
upswings in the business cycle in developed country time-series (Lindert
19 78).
The positive correlation between husband's education and income
does suggest caution in comparing the coefficients of husband's and
wife's education.
26 Expenditure

data were collected at four different times of the
year; regressions with dummy variables included fo~ the period when a
household was surveyed indicated spending on education varied systemati
cally by period because of the schooling cycle. However, coefficient s
on variables of interest were not different from those in Table 7.
Migrant families were equally represented in the different periods.
For discussion of the hypothesis that migrants achieve earnings
similar to longtime residents within 5 to 10 years, see Yap (1976).
27
walton (1977) states in describing early 20th century Medellin:
"The fervently Catholic labor force was not secularized by these trends
toward modernizati on. Traditional ly conservativ e beliefs persisted • • • "
(p. 71). Medellin is the industrial center of a region, Antioquia, which
has a reputation for independenc e and regional identity. It has not
been a center for in-migrants from other regions, as Cali and Bogota
have been. Musgrove (personal corresponde nce) suggests Medellin has
higher overall fertility because of a more highly-skew ed distribution
of income, with more families characterize d by low income and high
fertility.
28

such an increase in the fixed cost of child quality would lower
the relative price of child numbers, given they are substitutes , and
lead to an increase in number of children.
29

Dividin~ the coefficient on CHL (.075) by .4 (the mean investment
score for this sample)• .19, or about a 20 percent reduction in the
score with one additional child. To obtain the compensatin g 20 percent
increase in the score, we use .3, the coefficient on income:
• 3( X)

.4

= .20

:).

X

= .27

The mean log of income is 6.42, and e 6 · 42
e 6 · 69 = 804.

= 614.

6.42(1.27)

= 6.69,

and
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